jeudi 15 juin 2017
Descriptif
Durant le mois de juin 2017, le labex TransferS et Mathias
Girel (CAPHÉS) accueillent Alexander Klein, professeur de philosophie à
l’Université d’État de Californie, Long Beach (États-Unis).
Cette deuxième lecture d'Alexander Klein est organisée dans le cadre du colloque "La notion de conscience. À partir de William James.".
Lecture 2 : Consciousness as Caring : James’s Evolutionary Hypothesis
Between 1872 and 1890, William James developed a neglected form of interactionist dualism. He contended that to be phenomenally conscious is actively to evaluate what is in (or might be in) one’s environment, attending to what one decides is important, and ignoring much else. To be conscious is to care about one’s own actual or potential circumstances, in short ; and James hypothesized that this caring capacity was selected (in the Darwinian sense) because it regulated the behavior of vertebrates with highly articulated brains. He did not argue directly for this hypothesis, however. Instead, James recommended the hypothesis as a way to explain the surprising results concerning purposive behavior in decapitated frogs. I reconstruct and evaluate James’s evolutionary hypothesis, showing how it would explain those surprising experiments.
Consultez le programme du colloque " La notion de conscience. À partir de William James.".
Cette deuxième lecture d'Alexander Klein est organisée dans le cadre du colloque "La notion de conscience. À partir de William James.".
Lecture 2 : Consciousness as Caring : James’s Evolutionary Hypothesis
Between 1872 and 1890, William James developed a neglected form of interactionist dualism. He contended that to be phenomenally conscious is actively to evaluate what is in (or might be in) one’s environment, attending to what one decides is important, and ignoring much else. To be conscious is to care about one’s own actual or potential circumstances, in short ; and James hypothesized that this caring capacity was selected (in the Darwinian sense) because it regulated the behavior of vertebrates with highly articulated brains. He did not argue directly for this hypothesis, however. Instead, James recommended the hypothesis as a way to explain the surprising results concerning purposive behavior in decapitated frogs. I reconstruct and evaluate James’s evolutionary hypothesis, showing how it would explain those surprising experiments.
Consultez le programme du colloque " La notion de conscience. À partir de William James.".
Thèmes :
Philosophie
Catégories: Professeur invité - Labex TransferS
La notion de conscience. À partir de William James, Mot-clés : Philosophie, société, conscience, William James
Catégories: Professeur invité - Labex TransferS
La notion de conscience. À partir de William James, Mot-clés : Philosophie, société, conscience, William James
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