Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta Ingenio. Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta Ingenio. Mostrar todas las entradas

jueves, 31 de marzo de 2022

Conectando con Heráclito el Oscuro

Comparamos los dichos de Heráclito sobre las conexiones y la comprensión perspicaz, por un parte, con algunas intervenciones de la modernidad temprana sobre el ingenio y la perspicacia (Baltasar Gracián, Samuel Johnson, G. W. F. Hegel). Con énfasis especial sobre el papel de la retrospección, teorizada desde la poética cognitivista y la narratología.  

Texto completo:

Conectando con Heráclito el Oscuro

https://doi.org/10.17613/9xbc-zn91

Author(s):
José Angel GARCÍA LANDA (see profile)
Date:
2011
Group(s):
Literary theory, Philosophy
Subject(s):
Cognition, Poetics, Philosophy, Cognitive poetics
Item Type:
Article
Tag(s):
Insight, Wit, Heraclitus, Association of ideas
Permanent URL:
https://doi.org/10.17613/9xbc-zn91
 
English abstract: A comparison between Heraclitus' sayings on connections and insight, on the one hand, and early modern discussions of insightful wit (Baltasar Gracián, Samuel Johnson, G.W.F. Hegel). With a particular emphasis on the role of retrospection as theorized by cognitive poetics and narratology. _____________________________________________________________________________ Keywords: Cognition, Insight, Narratology, Wit, Poetics, Understanding, Baltasar Gracián, Samuel Johnson, Cognitive poetics,Connections,





DSC08054 copia
 
 
 
También aquí:

_____. "Conectando con Heráclito el Oscuro." In García Landa, Vanity Fea 2 Dec. 2011.* (Connections; Turner; Johnson; Gracián).

         http://vanityfea.blogspot.com/2011/12/conectando-con-heraclito.html

         2011

_____. "Conectando con Heráclito el Oscuro / Connecting with Heraclitus the Obscure." SSRN 15 Feb. 2022.*

         http://ssrn.com/abstract=3982728

         2021

_____. "Conectando con Heráclito el Oscuro." Academia 27 Dec. 2021.*

https://www.academia.edu/66117781/

         2021

_____. "Conectando con Heráclito el Oscuro." ResearchGate 10 Feb. 2022.*

         https://www.researchgate.net/publication/358511291

         2022

_____. "Conectando con Heráclito el Oscuro." Humanities Commons 31 March 2022.*

         https://doi.org/10.17613/9xbc-zn91

         https://hcommons.org/deposits/item/hc:45175/

         2022

_____. "Conectando con Heráclito el Oscuro." In García Landa, Vanity Fea 31 March 2022.*

         https://vanityfea.blogspot.com/2022/03/conectando-con-heraclito-el-oscuro.html

         2022

_____. "Conectando con Heráclito el Oscuro." Net Sight de José Angel García Landa 4 Jan. 2023.*

         https://personal.unizar.es/garciala/publicaciones/conectandocon.pdf

         2024



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miércoles, 4 de mayo de 2016

'De las crisis juiciosas': Gracián como analista cognitivista del discurso


En su tratado sobre el Arte de Ingenio (1642) Baltasar Gracián analiza la manera en que las posibles perspectivas temporales de una situación pueden manipularse mediante la retórica, y los modos en que el lenguaje puede usarse para desplazar los marcos de referencia que usamos a la hora de representar una acción, un acontecimiento o una situación, modificando de esta manera nuestras actitudes al respecto. Sostenemos que debido a la consciencia que este autor tiene de dichas maniobras cognitivas, el Arte de Ingenio es un tratado clásico de retórica cognitivista.



English Abstract:

'On Judicious Criticisms': Gracián as a Cognitivist Discourse Analyst

In his treatise Arte de Ingenio (The Art of Wit, 1642), Baltasar Gracián analyzes the way in which the possible temporal perspectives of a situation can be manipulated through rhetoric, and the way in which language can displace the frames of reference we use in order to represent an action, an event or a situation, thus modifying our attitudes towards them. We contend that due to this author's awareness of these cognitive maneuvers, The Art of Wit is a classical treatise in cognitivist rhetoric.


Note: Downloadable document is in Spanish.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 7
Keywords: Cognition, Rhetoric, Criticism, Wit, Frame theory, Representation, Baltasar Gracián, History of criticism, Discourse analysis. Cognitive narratology

Jose Angel Garcia Landa


Universidad de Zaragoza

Ibercampus (March 25, 2016)



IMG_3401 copia



También aquí:


_____. "De las Crisis Juiciosas." In García Landa, Vanity Fea 20 Jan. 2015.* (Gracián).

         http://vanityfea.blogspot.com.es/2015/01/de-las-crisis-juiciosas.html

         2015

_____. "De las crisis juiciosas: Gracián como analista cognitivista del discurso." Ibercampus 25 March 2016.*

         http://www.ibercampus.es/de-las-crisis-juiciosas-32693.htm

         2016 DISCONTINUED 2024 – Online at the Internet Archive:

         https://web.archive.org/web/20230308021419/http://www.ibercampus.es/de-las-crisis-juiciosas-32693.htm

         2024

_____. "De las crisis juiciosas: Gracián como analista cognitivista del discurso." SSRN 25 March 2016.*

         http://ssrn.com/abstract=2765700

         2017

_____. "'De las crisis juiciosas': Gracián como analista cognitivista del discurso." In García Landa, Vanity Fea 4 May 2016.*

         http://vanityfea.blogspot.com.es/2016/05/de-las-crisis-juiciosas-gracian-como.html

         2016

_____. "De las crisis juiciosas: Gracián como analista cognitivista del discurso." Academia 5 April 2017.*

         https://www.academia.edu/32262937/

         2017

_____. "De las crisis juiciosas: Gracián como analista cognitivista del discurso." ResearchGate 6 April 2017.*

         https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315798578

         2017

_____. "De las crisis juiciosas: Gracián como analista cognitivista del discurso." Net Sight de José Angel García Landa 5 Jan. 2023.*

         https://personal.unizar.es/garciala/publicaciones/delascrisis.pdf

         2023



—oOo—

miércoles, 12 de septiembre de 2012

Metaphysical Wit

From Samuel Johnson's Lives of the English Poets (Life of Cowley):

Wit, like all other things subject by their nature to the choice of man, has its changes and fashions, and at different times takes different forms. About the beginning of the seventeenth century appeared a race of writers that may be termed the metaphysical poets, of whom in a criticism on the works of Cowley it is not improper to give some account.

    The metaphysical poets were men of learning, and to show their learning was their whole endeavour; but, unluckily resolving to show it in rhyme, instead of writing poetry they only wrote verses, and very often such verses as stood the trial of the finger better than of the ear; for the modulation was so imperfect, that they were only found to be verses by counting the syllables.

     If the father of criticism has rightly denominated poetry tekhné mimetiké,  an imitative art, these writers will, without great wrong, lose their right to the name of poets, for they cannot be said to have imitated anything; they neither copied nature for life, neither painted the forms of matter, nor represented the operations of intellect.

     Those, however, who deny them to be poets, allow them to be wits. Dryden confesses of himself and his contemporaries, that they fall below Donne in wit, but maintains that they surpass him in poetry.

     If wit be well described by Pope, as being "that which has been often thought, but was never before so well expressed," they certainly never attained, nor ever sought it; for they endeavoured to be singular in their thoughts, and were careless of their diction.  But Pope's account of wit is undoubtedly erroneous: he depresses it below its natural dignity, and reduces it from strength of thought to happiness of language. 

     If by a more noble and more adequate conception that be considered as wit which is at once natural and new, that which, though not obvious, is, upon its first production, acknowledged to be just; if it be that which he that never found it wonders how he missed, to wit of this kind the metaphysical poets have seldom risen.  Their thoughts are often new, but seldom natural; they are not obvious, but neither are they just; and the reader, far from wondering that he missed them, wonders more frequently by what perverseness of industry they were found. 

     But wit, abstracted from its effects upon the hearer, may be more rigorously and philosophically considered as a kind of discordia concors;  a combination of dissimilar images, or discovery of occult resemblances in things apparently unlike.  Of wit, thus defined, they have more than enough.  The most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together; nature and art are ransacked for illustrations, comparisons, and allusions; their learning instructs, and their subtlety surprises; but the reader commonly thinks his improvement dearly bought, and, though he sometimes admires, is seldom pleased. 

     From this account of their compositions it will be readily inferred that they were not successful in representing or moving the affections. As they were wholly employed on something unexpected and surprising, they had no regard to that uniformity of sentiment which enables us to conceive and to excite the pains and the pleasure of other minds: they never inquired what on any occasion they should have said or done; but wrote rather as beholders than partakers of human nature; as beings looking upon good and evil, impassive and at leisure; as Epicurean deities making remarks on the actions of men and the vicissitudes of life, without interest and without emotion. Their courtship was void of fondness and their lamentation of sorrow. Their wish was only to say what they hoped had never been said before.

     Nor was the sublime more within their reach than the pathetic; for they never attempted that comprehension and expanse of thought which at once fills the whole mind, and of which the first effect is sudden astonishment, and the second rational admiration. Sublimity is produced by aggregation, and littleness by dispersion. Great thoughts are always general, and consist in positions not limited by exceptions and in descriptions not descending to minuteness. It is with great propriety that subtlety, which in its original import means exility of particles, is taken in its metaphorical meaning for nicety of distinction. Those writers who lay on the watch for novelty could have little hope of greatness; for great things cannot have escaped former observation. Their attempts were always analytic; they broke every image into fragments; and could no more represent, by their slender conceits and laboured particularities, the prospects of nature, or the scenes of life, than he who dissects a sunbeam with a prism can exhibit the wide effulgence of a summer moon.

     What they wanted however of the sublime they endeavored to supply by hyperbole; their amplification had no limits: they left not only reason but fancy behind them, and produced combinations of confused magnificence that not only could not be credited, but could not be imagined.
     Yet great labour directed by great abilities is never wholly lost: if they frequently threw away their wit upon false conceits, they likewise sometimes struck out unexpected truth: if their conceits were farfetched, they were often worth the carriage. To write on their plan it was at least necessary to read and to think. No man could be born a metaphysical poet, nor assume the dignity of a writer by descriptions copied from descriptions, by imitations borrowed from imitations, by traditional imagery and hereditary similes, by readiness of rhyme and volubility of syllables.

(...)



viernes, 2 de diciembre de 2011

Conectando con Heráclito el Oscuro


Partamos de una cita de Heráclito, en esta traducción que me encuentro en el Brown Alumni Magazine:

"A wonderful harmony arises from joining together the seemingly unconnected".


Cita este texto Aristóteles, en su Ética a Nicómaco (VIII.2, 1155b): "Heráclito dice que lo opuesto concuerda y que de las cosas discordantes surge la más bella armonía, 'y que todo sucede según discordia'." Es una frase en la que están las semillas de muchas futuras reflexiones. Su conexión con ellas podría parecer más o menos remota. Me interesa resaltar aquí un par de loci classici.

Primero, del propio Heráclito, pues esta frase se relaciona con otros aspectos de su pensamiento, en los que enfatiza la coherencia subyacente de las cosas, más allá de su aparente diversidad u oposición.
La apariencia de discordancia, y la concordancia o coherencia profunda, entendida y expresada por el filósofo, es un tema fundamental en Heráclito. En la paráfrasis de Kirk y Raven, "Men should try to comprehend the underlying coherence of things: it is expressed in the Logos, the formula or element of arrangement common to things." (Kirk & Raven 187). La palabra da razón de lo que parecía diverso, y lo explica. Heráclito es, supuestamente, el filósofo de la diversidad, la discordia y la discontinuidad, pero como vemos hay más bien una tensión dialéctica entre la diversidad y la unidad en su pensamiento: el camino arriba y abajo es uno y el mismo. En su cosmología, en general, "lo uno, al diverger, converge consigo mismo, como la armonía del arco y la lira" (Los filósofos presocráticos I.225). O bien, "An unapparent connexion is stronger than an apparent one" (fr. 210 Kirk y Raven); "The real constitution of things is accustomed to hide itself" (fr. 211 Kirk y Raven)—de ahí la aletheia como operación cognitiva. No deja de ser irónico que a Heráclito le reprochase Demetrio la oscuridad resultante de la falta de conexión en sus discursos.

Otro texto que podemos traer a colación es el comentario de Samuel Johnson sobre los poetas metafísicos y sus extravagantes conceptos—seguida por su discusión del "auténtico ingenio". Viene de su "Life of Cowley":


If wit be well described by Pope, as being "that which has been often thought, but was never before so well expressed," [the metaphysical poets] certainly never attained, nor ever sought it; for they endeavoured to be singular in their thoughts, and were careless of their diction.  But Pope's account of wit is undoubtedly erroneous: he depresses it below its natural dignity, and reduces it from strength of thought to happiness of language. 
    If by a more noble and more adequate conception that be considered as wit which is at once natural and new, that which, though not obvious, is, upon its first production, acknowledged to be just; if it be that which he that never found it wonders how he missed, to wit of this kind the metaphysical poets have seldom risen.  Their thoughts are often new, but seldom natural; they are not obvious, but neither are they just; and the reader, far from wondering that he missed them, wonders more frequently by what perverseness of industry they were found. 
    But wit, abstracted from its effects upon the hearer, may be more rigorously and philosophically considered as a kind of discordia concors;  a combination of dissimilar images, or discovery of occult resemblances in things apparently unlike.  Of wit, thus defined, they have more than enough.  The most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together; nature and art are ransacked for illustrations, comparisons, and allusions; their learning instructs, and their subtlety surprises; but the reader commonly thinks his improvement dearly bought, and, though he sometimes admires, is seldom pleased. 

Y, un siglo antes, también viene a cuento relacionar con el dicho de Heráclito la discusión del ingenio que se da en el Tratado de la agudeza de Baltasar Gracián. Por ejemplo en esta reflexión sobre la metáfora, que seguro habría de ser apreciada por los actuales teorizadores de la lingüística cognitiva:

"La Semejança o Metafora, ya por lo gustoso de su artificio, ya por lo facil de su acomodacion, suele ser la ordinaria oficina de los discursos; y aunque tan vulgar, se hallan en ella Compuestos prodigiosos."

—así el análisis que hace de la comparación entre San Juan Bautista y el Fénix:

"Quando se ajustan todas las circunstancias del sujeto, al termino de la translacion, sin violencia, y con tan grande consonancia, que cada parte de la metafora, fuera un relevante concepto, està en su mayor exaltacion el compuesto." (Discurso XLIIII, "De los Compuestos por Metafora").

O, en el Discurso XXXXV que le sigue, "De la Acolucia y Trabaçon de los Discursos", también se echa de ver cómo la argumentación brillante consiste en relacionar las partes aparentemente inconexas que se van tratando en las distintas secciones de un discurso—uniendo lo aparentemente inconexo, como decía Heráclito:

"Acontece tal vez, que vna propuesta vna Hypotesis, o asunto, contiene muchas partes, y el discurso entonces consiste en irlas prouando todas, explicando, y especificandolas, de suerte que no es menester mas trabaçon, porque la propuesta las ciñe todas, y las vne en si. (...) Otras vezes aunque la primera propuesta no es general, pero da pie, y ocasion a la segunda, y esta a la tercera".

Así, de diversas maneras, la argumentación y exposición es una continua relación de lo aparentemente inconexo, trayéndolo a la luz y creando en el discurso un sistema de atención que expone su conexión subyacente y la hace objeto de la consciencia. "Acoplamientos: cosas íntegras y no íntegras, convergente divergente, consonante disonante; de todas las cosas una y de una todas las cosas" (Heráclito, Los filósofos presocráticos I.201).

Una última cuestión que me interesa resaltar sobre el dicho de Heráclito es que apunta a una teoría de la retrospección intelectual, o cognitiva. La consiliencia de lo diverso, que incluye una mirada retrospectiva sobre lo antes pensado, y su reelaboración en una síntesis, precursora de la producida por la dialéctica hegeliana. Los fenómenos a los que se refiere Heráclito, los que producen una armonía extraordinaria, tenían una conexión intrínseca, pero tal conexión no aparecía. Se hace visible por arte de quien los une—pero ya estaban unidos—es decir, de quien formula de modo visible y explícito esa unión, o llama la atención sobre ella. El Logos de Heráclito también podría interpretarse en este sentido—en el sentido de dar razón de algo, mediante la palabra. La armonía intelectual que surge es la armonía de una mayor comprensión de las relaciones entre los fenómenos—no una asociación caprichosa de ideas, sino un reconocimiento de lo que antes no se conocía, por mucho que estuviese presente, y ahora sí se conoce. Es en cierto modo la armonía que produce nuestra perspectiva superior sobre nosotros mismos, nuestra topsight, o perspectiva dominante, sobre lo que antes era nuestra percepción limitada de los fenómenos, cuando no podíamos apreciar su conexión.
___

Como deberes o reto intelectual para el lector, le propondré (que no le ofreceré) una integración o fusión conceptual entre las conexiones iluminadoras de Heráclito el Oscuro, y la teoría del pensamiento metafórico, o, más ampliamente, la noción de integración conceptual desarrollada por Fauconnier y Turner.  La sugerencia la ofrezco, y la fusión ya está así amagada.



___

La frase de Heráclito también es una teoría de la explicación o de la evidencia. Más sobre explicaciones aquí, en The limits of explanation.  Lo breve, si bueno, no tan breve.

 

_____________________

 

Fauconnier, Gilles, y Mark Turner. "Conceptual Integration Networks." Versión ampliada, 10 Feb. 2001. Social Science Research Network 3 Nov. 2008.

         http://ssrn.com/abstract=1292966

         2015

Gracián, Baltasar. Arte de ingenio. Tratado de la agudeza. Edición facsímil (Madrid: Juan Sánchez, 1642). Introd. Aurora Egido. Zaragoza: Gobierno de Aragón / Institución "Fernando El Católico", 2005.

Johnson, Samuel. Lives of the English Poets. Introd. L. Archer-Hind. 2 vols. (Everyman's Library, 770, 771). London: Dent; New York: Dutton, 1925. 1946.

Kirk, G. S., y J. E. Raven. The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1957.

 



 
 
—oOo—

jueves, 30 de junio de 2011

Hegel on Wilde


The avatars of mind in Hegel's monumental  Phenomenology of Spirit include some paragraphs on the witty spirit—as a mode of reaction of the individual subject in the face of the dominance of money interests as a criterion of value. A picture on the deep signification of verbal irony in the age of high accumulation, or perhaps a portrait of a skeptical flâneur in the age of mechanical capitalism, exposing its contradictions in polished pellets of expression. One cannot but feel that in the following account Hegel is referring to Oscar Wilde—not in 1807, but now.

 
§520.
Just as self-consciousness had its own language with state power, in other words, just as Spirit emerged as actively mediating between these extremes, so also has self-consciousness its own language in dealing with wealth; but still more so when it rebels. The language that gives wealth a sense of its essential significance, and thereby gains possession of it, is likewise the language of flattery, but of base flattery; for what it pronounces to be an essence, it knows to be expendable, to be without any intrinsic being. The language of flattery, however, as we have already observed, is Spirit that is still one-sided. For although its moments are indeed the self which has been refined by the discipline of service into a pure existence, and the intrinsic being of power, yet the pure Notion in which the simple, unitary self and the in-itself, the former a pure 'I' and the latter this pure essence or thought, are the same—this unity of the two sides which are in reciprocal relation is not present in the consciousness that uses this language. The object is still for consciousness an intrinsic being in contrast to the self, that is, the object is not for consciousness at the same time consciousness's own self as such. The language of the disrupted consciousness is, however, the perfect language and the authentic existent Spirit of this entire world of culture. This self-consciousness which rebels against this rejection of itself is eo ipso absolutely self-identical in its absolute disruption, the pure mediation of pure self-consciousness with itself. It is the sameness of the identical judgement in which one and the same personality is both subject and predicate. But this identical judgement is at the same time the infinite judgement; for this personality is absolutelly dirempted, and subject and predicate are utterly indifferent, immediate beings which have nothing to do with one another, which have no necessary unity, so much so that each is the power of a separate independent personality. The being-for-self [of this consciousness] has its own being-for-self for object as an out-and-out 'other'; not as if this had a different content, for the content is the same self in the form of an absolute antithesis and a completely indifferent existence of its own. Here, then, we have the Spirit of this real world of culture, Spirit that is conscious of itself in its truth and in its Notion.

§521. It is this absolute and universal inversion of the actual world o thought: it is pure culture. What is learnt in this world is that neither the actuality of power and wealth, nor their specific Notions, 'good' and 'bad', or the consciousness of 'good' and 'bad'  (the noble and the ignoble consciousness), possess truth; on the contrary, all these moments become inverted, one changing into the other, and each is the opposite of itself. The universal power, which is the Substance, when it acquires a spiritual nature of its own through the principle of individuality, receives its own self merely as a name, and though it is the actuality of power, is really the powerless being that sacrifices its own self. But this expendable, self-less being, or the self that has become a Thing, is rather the return of that being into itself; it is being-for-self that is explicitly for itself, the concrete existence of Spirit. The thoughts of these two essences, of 'good' and 'bad', are similarly inverted in this movement; what is characterized as good is bad, and vice-versa. The consciousness of each of these moments, the consciousness judged as noble and ignoble, are rather. in their truth just as much the reverse of what these characterizations are supposed to be; the noble consciousness is ignoble and repudiated, just as the repudiated consciousness changes round into the nobility which characterizes the most highly developed freedom of self-consciousness. From a formal standpoint, everything is outwardly the reverse of what it is for itself; and again, it is not in truth what it is for itself, but something else than it wants to be; being-for-self is rather the loss of itself, and its self-alienation rather the preservation of itself. What we have here, then, is that all the moments execute a universal justice on one another, each just as much alienates its own self, as it forms itself into its opposite and in this way inverts it. True Spirit, however, is just this unity of the absolutely separate moments, and, indeed, it is just through the free actuality of these selfless extremes that, as their middle term, it achieves a concrete existence. It exists in the universal talk and destructive judgement which strips of their significance all those moments which are supposed to count as the true being and as actual members of the whole, and is equally this nihilistic game which it plays with itself. This judging and talking is, therefore, what is true and invincible, while it overpowers everything; it is solely with this alone that one has truly to do with in this actual world. In this world, the Spirit of each part finds expression, or is wittily talked about, and finds said about it what it is. The honest individual takes each moment to be an abiding essentiality, and is the uneducated thoughtlessness of not knowing that it is equally doing the reverse. The disrupted consciousness, however, is consciousness of the perversion, and, moreover, of the absolute perversion. What prevails in it is the Notion, which brings together in a unity the thoughts which, in the honest individual, lie far apart, and its language is therefore clever and witty.




§522. The content of what Spirit says about itself is thus the perversion of every Notion and reality, the universal deception of oneself and others; and the shamelessness which gives utterance to this deception is just for that reason the greatest truth. This kind of talk is the madness of the musician 'who heaped up and mixed together thirty arias, Italian, French, tragic, comic, of every sort; now with a deep bass he descended into hell, then, contracting his throat, he rent the vaults of heaven with a falsetto tone, frantic and soothed, imperios and mocking, by turns' (Diderot, Nephew of Rameau).
To the tranquil consciousness which, in its honest way, takes the melody of the Good and the True to consist in the evenness of the notes, i.e. in unison, this talk appears as a 'rigmarole of wisdom and folly, as a medley of as much skill as baseness, of as many correct as false ideas, a mixture compounded of a complete perversion of sentiment, of absolute shamefulness, and of perfect frankness and truth. It will be unable to refrain from entering into all these tones and running up and down the entire scale of feelings from the profoundest contempt and dejection to the highest pitch of admiration and emotion; but blended with the latter will be a tinge of ridicule which spoils them' (ibid.). The former, however, will find in their subversive depths the all-powerful note which restores Spirit to itself.

J. N. Findlay's account of the following paragraphs is as follows:

§523. Plain sense and sound morality can teach this disintegrated brilliance nothing that it does not know. It can merely utter some of the syllables the latter weaves into its piebald discourse. In conceding that the bad and the good are mixed in life, it merely substitutes dull platitude for witty brilliance.

§524. The disintegrated consciousness can be noble and edifying but this is for it only one note among others. To ask it to forsake its disintegration is merely, from its own point of view, to preach a new eccentricity, that of Diogenes in his tub.

§525. The disintegrated consciousness is, however, on the way to transcending its disintegration. It sees the vanity of treating all things as vain, and so becomes serious.

§526. Wit really emancipates the disintegrated consciousness from finite material aim and gives it true spiritual freedom. In knowing itself as disintegrated it also rises above this, and achieves a truly positive self-consciousness.


In Hegel's words—here's where he comments on Wilde, and on the self-transcending vanity of wit:

§525. But in point of fact, Spirit has already accomplished this in principle [i.e. its own dissolution, winning for itself a still higher consciousness]. The consciousness that is aware of its disruption and openly declares it, derides existence and the universal confusion, and derides its own self as well; it is at the same time the fading, but still audible, sound of all this confusion. This vanity of all reality and every definite Notion, vanity which knows itself to be such, is the double reflection of the real world into itself: once in this particular self of consciousness qua particular, and again in the pure universality of consciousness, or in thought. In the first case, Spirit that has come to itself has directed its gaze to the world of actuality and still has there its purpose and immediate content; but, in the other case, its gaze is in part turned only inward and negatively against it, and in part is turned away from that world towards heaven, and its object is the beyond of this world.

§526. In that aspect of the return into the self, the vanity of all things is its own vanity, it is itself vain. It is the self-centred self that knows, not only how to pass judgement on and chatter about everything, but how to give witty expression to the contradiction that is present in the solid elements of the actual world, as also in the fixed determinations posited by judgement; and this contradiction is their truth. Looked at from the point of view of form, it knows everything to be self-alienated, being-for-self is separated from being-in-itself; what is meant, and purpose, are separated from truth; and from both again, the being-for-another, the ostensible meaning from the real meaning, from the true thing and intention. Thus it knows how to give correct expression to each moment in relation to its opposite, in general, how to express accurately the perversion of everything; it knows better than each what each is, no matter what its specific nature is. Since it knows the substantial from the side of the ddisunion and conflict which are united within the substantial itself, but not from the side of this union, it understands very well how to pass judgement on it, but has lost the ability to comprehend it. This vanity at the same time needs the vanity of all things in order to get from them the consciousness of self; it therefore creates this vanity itself and is the soul that supports it. Power and wealth are the supreme ends of its exertions, it knows that through renunciation and sacrifice it forms itself into the universal, attains to the possession of it, and in this possession is universally recognized and accepted: state power and wealth are the real and acknowledged powers. However, this recognition and acceptance is itself vain; and just by taking possession of power and wealth it knows them to be without a self of their own, knows rather that it is the power over them, while they are vain things. The fact that in possessing them it is itself apart from and beyond them, is exhibited in its witty talk which is, therefore, its supreme interest and the truth of the whole relationship. In such talk, this particular self, qua this pure self, determined neither by reality nor by thought, develops into a spiritual self that is of truly universal worth. It is the self-disruptive nature of all relationships and the conscious disruption of them; but only as self-consciousness in revolt is it aware of its own disrupted state, and in thus knowing it has immediately risen above it. In that vanity, all content is turned into something negative which can no longer be grasped as having a positive significance. The positive object is merely the pure 'I' itself, and the disrupted consciousness in itself this pure self-identity of self-consciousness that has returned to itself.


Hegel's account of the self-transcendence of wit probably owes something to Friedrich Schlegel's notion of the reflexive and self-critical "romantic irony" in Athenäum. However, it might be argued that its main inspiration comes from the future—from the as yet imperfectly realized odyssey of the spirit in the work and personality of Oscar Wilde.




—oOo—

—And as a reminder, here follow some examples of paradoxical brilliance from the Wilde side:




People fashion their God after their own understanding. They make their God first and worship him afterwards.

There is only one thing in the world that is worse than being talked about, and that is not being talked about.

The only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it.

Work is the curse of the drinking classes.

Always forgive your enemies; nothing annoys them so much.

The world is a stage, but the play is badly cast.

Alas, I am dying beyond my means.

I never put off till tomorrow what I can do the day after.

In examinations the foolish ask questions that the wise cannot answer.

One should always be in love; that is the reason one should never marry.

A man who desires to get married should know either everything or nothing.

America is the only country that went from barbarism to decadence without civilization in between.

All art is quite useless.

Education is an admirable thing, but it is well to remember from time to time that nothing that is worth knowing can be taught.

I sometimes think that God in creating man somewhat overestimated his ability.

Some cause happiness wherever they go; others, whenever they go.

A cynic is a man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing.

Fashion is a form of ugliness so intolerable that we have to alter it every six months.

The old believe everything; the middle-aged suspect everything; the young know everything.

Marriage is the triumph of imagination over intelligence. Second marriage is the triumph of hope over experience.

To live is the rarest thing in the world. Most people exist, that is all.

Disobedience, in the eyes of anyone who has read history, is man’s original virtue. It is through disobedience that progress has been made, through disobedience and through rebellion.

To love oneself is the beginning of a lifelong romance.

I am not young enough to know everything.

I choose my friends for their good looks, my acquaintances for their good characters, and my enemies for their good intellects. A man cannot be too careful in the choice of his enemies. I have not got one who is a fool. They are all men of some intellectual power, and consequently they all appreciate me.
    -Henry Wotton, The Picture of Dorian Gray

Laughter is not at all a bad beginning to a friendship, and it is far the best ending to one.
    -Henry Wotton, The Picture of Dorian Gray

The aim of life is self-development. To realize one’s nature perfectly—that is what each of us is here for.
    -Henry Wotton, The Picture of Dorian Gray

Peole say sometimes that Beauty is only superficial. That may be so. But at least it is not so superficial as Thought is. To me, Beauty is the wonder of wonders. It is only shallow people who do not judge by appearances.
    -Henry Wotton, The Picture of Dorian Gray

Science is the record of dead religions.

Only the shallow know themselves.



 
—oOo—

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