Descriptif
Durant le mois de juin 2017, le labex TransferS et Mathias Girel (CAPHÉS) accueillent Alexander KLEIN, professeur de philosophie à l’Université d’État de Californie, Long Beach (États-Unis)
Cette troisième lecture d'Alexander Klein est organisée dans le cadre du colloque "La notion de conscience. À partir de William James."
Like heartburn, a pronounced discomfort with the very idea of
consciousness followed the early days of experimental psychology.
Received wisdom has it that psychologists (and allied philosophers) came
to mistrust consciousness for largely behaviorist reasons. But by the
time John Watson had published his behaviorist manifesto in 1913, a
wider revolt against consciousness was already underway. I begin by
canvassing some of the lesser-known, pre-behaviorist angst about
consciousness. Then I delve into the case of William James—an important
early source of unease about consciousness. James’s rejection of
consciousness grew out of his critique of perceptual elementarism in
psychology. This is the view that most mental states are complex, and
that psychology’s goal is in some sense to analyze these states into
their atomic “elements.” Elementarism came in for intense criticism in
James’s Principles of Psychology, and I argue that his later rejection
of consciousness is an extension of the earlier critique. Just as we
cannot (according to James) isolate any atomic, sensory elements in our
occurrent mental states, so we cannot distinguish any elemental
consciousness from any separate contents.
Thèmes :
Philosophie
Catégories: Professeur invité - Labex TransferS
La notion de conscience. À partir de William James, Mot-clés : conscience, William James
Catégories: Professeur invité - Labex TransferS
La notion de conscience. À partir de William James, Mot-clés : conscience, William James
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