Hobbes y los okupas

Un pasaje de Hobbes sobre la jurisprudencia de la okupación, a cuenta de una cuestión más general de hermenéutica jurídica. El apartado del Leviatán ("Of Common-Wealth") titulado "The Difference between the Letter and the Sentence of the Law": 

In written Lawes, men use to make a difference between the Letter, and the Sentence of the Law: And when by the Letter, is meant whatsoever can be gathered from the bare words, 'tis well distinguished. For the significations of almost all words, are either in themselves, or in the metaphoricall use of them, ambiguous; and may be drawn in argument, to make many senses; but there is onely one sense of the Law. But if by the Letter, be meant the literall sense, then the Letter, and the Sentence of intention of the Law, is all one. For the literall sense is that, which the Legislator intended, should by the letter of the Law be signified. Now the Intention of the Legislator is alwayes supposed to be Equity: For it were a great contumely for a Judge to think otherwise of the Soveraigne. He ought therefore, if the word of the Law doe not fully authorise a reasonable Sentence, to supply it with the Law of Nature; or if the case be difficult, to respit Judgement till he have received more ample authority. For Example, a written Law ordaineth, that he which is thrust out of his house by force, shall be restored by force, in which case there is no speciall Law ordained. It is evident, that this case is contained in the same Law. For else there is no remedy for him at all; which is to be supposed against the Intention of the legislator. Again, the word of the Law, commandeth to judge according to the Evidence: A man is accused falsely of a fact, which the Judge saw himself done by another; and not by him that is accused. In this case neither shall the Letter of the Law be followed to the condemnation of the Innocent, nor shall the Judge give Sentence against the eidence of the Witnesses; because the Letter of the Law is to the contrary; but procure of the Soveraign that another be made Judge, and himsefe Witnesse. So that the incommodity that follows the bare words of a written Law, may lead him to the intention of the Law, whreby to interpret the same the better; though no Incommodity can warrant a Sentence against the Law. For every Judge of Right, and Wrong, is not Judge of what is Commodious, or Incommodious to the Common-wealth.

—oOo—