Hume on Personal Identity

Notes from:

Hume, David.  A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon, 1896.*

 

 

 

Hume on personal identity (Book I, Part IV, vi).

 

“We have a distinct idea of an object, that remains invariable and uninterrupted thro’ a suppos’d variation of time; and this idea we call that of identity or sameness. We have also a distinct idea of several different objects existing in succession, and connected together by a close relation: and this to an accurate view affords as perfect a notion of diversity, as if there was no manner of relation among the objects. But tho’ these two ideas of identity, and a succession of related objects be in themselves perfectly distinct, and even contrary, yet ’tis certain, that in our common way of thinking they are generally confounded with each other” (Hume 253).

 

“our propension to confound identity with relation is so great, that we are apt to imagine something unknown and mysterious, connecting the parts, beside their relation” (254).

 

“all objects, to which we ascribe identity, without observing their invariableness and uninterruptedness, are such as consist of a succession of related objects” (255).

 

“where the changes are at last observ’d to become considerable, we make a scruple of ascribing identity to such different objects” (257) (Identity is created by the “uninterrrupted progress of the thought” (256)—then debate will question identities).

 

Identity is ascribed by the observer, it is not in the associated things themselves. (260). (By the self-observer, in his reflective capacity, not by the spontaneous connection of ideas in the mind).

 

“the memory not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production, by producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions. (…). As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, ‘tis to be consider’d, upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity.” (261) 

 

But it does not entirely produce our identity, as we extend it beyond our memory (262).

 

Problems of identity “are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties” and “merely verbal” disputes (262).

 

Hume as a solitary monster: “such is my weakness, that I feel all my opinions loosen and fall of themselves, when unsupported by the approbation of others” (264-5). 

 

He is forced to ordinary communication and daily life (269) but returns to philosophy both for pleasure and safety of opinion (271).

 

 

—oOo—