SAVOIRS ENS http://savoirs.ens.fr/expose.php?id=3115 jeudi 08 juin 2017
Descriptif
Durant le mois de juin 2017, le labex TransferS et Mathias
Girel (CAPHÉS) ont accueilli Alexander KLEIN, professeur de philosophie à
l’Université d’État de Californie, Long Beach (États-Unis).
Cette première lecture d'Alexander Klein est organisée dans le cadre du colloque "La notion de conscience. À partir de William James."
Lecture 1 : The Curious Case of the Decapitated Frog
Physiologists have long known that some vertebrates can survive for months without a brain. This phenomenon attracted limited attention until the 19th century when a series of experiments on living, decapitated frogs ignited a controversy about consciousness. Pflüger demonstrated that such creatures do not just exhibit reflexes ; they also perform purposive behaviors. Suppose one thinks, along with Pflüger’s ally Lewes, that purposive behavior is a mark of consciousness. Then one must count a decapitated frog as conscious. If one rejects this mark, one can avoid saying peculiar things about decapitated animals. But as Huxley showed, this position leads quickly to epiphenomenalism. The dispute long remained stalemated because it rested on conflicting sets of intuitions that were each compatible with the growing body of experiments. Understanding this controversy in physiology is a necessary background to grasping James’s evolutionary account of consciousness.
Cette première lecture d'Alexander Klein est organisée dans le cadre du colloque "La notion de conscience. À partir de William James."
Lecture 1 : The Curious Case of the Decapitated Frog
Physiologists have long known that some vertebrates can survive for months without a brain. This phenomenon attracted limited attention until the 19th century when a series of experiments on living, decapitated frogs ignited a controversy about consciousness. Pflüger demonstrated that such creatures do not just exhibit reflexes ; they also perform purposive behaviors. Suppose one thinks, along with Pflüger’s ally Lewes, that purposive behavior is a mark of consciousness. Then one must count a decapitated frog as conscious. If one rejects this mark, one can avoid saying peculiar things about decapitated animals. But as Huxley showed, this position leads quickly to epiphenomenalism. The dispute long remained stalemated because it rested on conflicting sets of intuitions that were each compatible with the growing body of experiments. Understanding this controversy in physiology is a necessary background to grasping James’s evolutionary account of consciousness.
Thèmes :
Philosophie
Catégories: Professeur invité - Labex TransferS
La notion de conscience. À partir de William James, Mot-clés : société, conscience, William James
Catégories: Professeur invité - Labex TransferS
La notion de conscience. À partir de William James, Mot-clés : société, conscience, William James
No hay comentarios:
Publicar un comentario
Se aceptan opiniones alternativas, e incluso coincidentes: