domingo, 22 de mayo de 2016

Hegel and the Concept of World HIstory


Hegel and the Concept of World History. Conference at Kingston U / London Graduate School, 14 / 15 April 2016. Online audio at Backdoor Broadcasting Company.*
         2016

Objektiver Geist occupies an intermediary position in the general context of Hegel’s system. It was, however, a late “discovery” encountered in a double exteriority, both outside the subjective and separate from absolute spirit. Hegel’s passion for the objective led to numerous returns to the system’s middle term to rework and update its content. When this effort was interrupted by the philosopher’s death, the first Hegelians took up the challenge to furnish the system’s middle grounds with the philosophy of history and other posthumous fragments of teaching or early writings. If the Hegelian concept of objective spirit was developed on the grounds of history, rather than political economy, is the concept itself subject-specific? What does it cover, designate, constrain, impose, or conceptualize? Is objective spirit still to be thought there, where it imposed itself on Hegel, on the first Hegelians, and on later ones (Left, Right and Centre)? This two-day conference seeks to address questions arising from the concept of world history in relation to the form, function, and content of objective spirit as presented in the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences and Elements of the Philosophy of Right.
Plenary speakers

  •     Stefania Achella (University of Chieti, Pescara & Ecole Normale Supérieure of Pisa)
  •     Myriam Bienenstock (University Francois-Rabelais, Tours)
  •     Paolo Diego Bubbio (Western Sydney University)
  •     George di Giovanni (McGill University)
  •     Bruno Haas (University of Dresden) —and we begin with:

  •     Jean- Francois Kervégan (University of Paris I, Pantheon-Sorbonne) - Philosophy of History - Kant vs. Hegel.



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